

~~SECRET~~COPY NO. 2812 November 1946CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPSUPPLEMENTAL DIRECTIVE NO. 1
TO C.I.G. DIRECTIVE NO. 15EXPLOITATION OF AMERICAN BUSINESS CONCERNS AND
SCIENTIFIC, EDUCATION, AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZA-
TIONS WITH CONNECTIONS ABROAD AND AMERICAN RESIDENTS
TRAVELING ABROAD AS SOURCES OF FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATIONMemorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence

The following instructions are issued to implement the policies and procedures set forth in paragraph 3 of C.I.G.

Directive No. 15:

I. ESTABLISHMENT OF CONTACT REGISTER

In order to establish and maintain a contact register, the participating agencies will promptly submit the following information to C.I.G. in the indicated order of priority:

1. A list of all American business concerns and organizations with which contact is being or has been maintained since 1 January 1946 for the purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence information, including:

a. The name and address of the organization with brief description of type of business and importance as a source of foreign intelligence information. If a subsidiary, the name and location of parent organization.

b. Statement whether support of company as a whole has been obtained for furnishing foreign intelligence information, giving name of authorizing official.

c. The full name and official title of each individual contacted in the organization.

d. The foreign countries in which the organization operates, divided as follows:

(1) Those countries in which the organization's senior representative is an American citizen.

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(2) Those countries in which the organization's senior representative is not an American citizen.

e. The type of contact established, i.e.:

(1) Contact made periodically on some established schedule.

(2) Contact made only when a specific request for information is to be presented,

(3) Contact made only when source indicates that information is available.

(4) Contact made otherwise, with description.

2. A list of all individuals, not connected with a business or other organization, with whom liaison is now being maintained for the collection of foreign intelligence information, including:

a. Full name and address.

b. Occupation and citizenship.

c. Topics and countries on which the individual is a source of foreign intelligence information.

3. A list of all individuals, on a continuing basis, interviewed only for the purpose of establishing their foreign intelligence information potential, including:

a. Full name, address, and citizenship.

b. If connected with an organization, their position therein and name, address, and activity of organization.

c. Topics and countries on which the individual is a potential source of foreign intelligence information.

NOTES: (a) No organization or individual will be included in any of the above lists if the reporting agency has had no contact therewith for the collection of foreign intelligence information since 1 January 1946.
(b) The term "contact" used therein is understood to mean the contacting and processing of an individual or organization, after security check is complete, and therefrom producing foreign intelligence information.

4. One of the primary purposes of the C.I.G. Contact Register is to provide means for avoiding duplication of contacts. After any of the above lists have been submitted, C.I.G. will carefully

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check same and will notify the participating agencies immediately of any contacts which should be reallocated.

II. SECURITY MEASURES.

5. C.I.G. will be responsible for security name checks of organizations and individuals with F.B.I. At the request of C.I.G., the member agencies will perform name checks on special cases within the limits of capability.

6. When a security name check reveals derogatory information, the participating agency which submitted the name will be informed.

7. When a name is cleared for exploitation, the C.I.G. Contact Register will indicate that satisfactory security check has been completed.

III. OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS.

8. Within an area in which C.I.G. has established a local interagency office, the collection of foreign intelligence information from American business concerns, other organizations and individuals in that area will be coordinated as follows:

a. C.I.G. will be responsible for securing and maintaining the over-all cooperation of business concerns and organizations in supplying foreign intelligence information. C.I.G. will establish and maintain contacts with the responsible officials of such organizations.

Upon receipt by C.I.G. of the contact lists:

(1) The participating agencies will introduce the C.I.G. representatives to responsible officials of those American concerns and organizations with whom they have established liaison and from whom they have secured the cooperation of the organization as a whole. The new coordinated interagency operation will be explained to such officials and C.I.G. will thereafter maintain the over-all organization contact.

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(2) Where over-all support of an organization has not been previously secured by a participating agency and exploitation has been carried out by ^{CONTACT} ~~contact~~ with subordinate officials, C.I.G. will attempt to secure the over-all support of such organization; thereafter exploitation of subordinates will only be conducted as arranged by C.I.G. 2 Dec 44

(3) With respect to all organizations not previously exploited by participating agencies, the C.I.G. local interagency office will initiate the contacts and obtain the over-all support to exploit the contact for foreign intelligence information.

(4) Once a contact has been established by C.I.G. local interagency office, that office will undertake to obtain that type of intelligence information made available by the contact but not covered by specific request from participating agencies, and will disseminate same to the Government agencies concerned.

b. With respect to contacts with private individuals as described in paragraph 2 above, participating agencies, before exploiting the contact, will first obtain clearance from the C.I.G. local interagency office. Thereafter the contact will be handled in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 8-c, subparagraphs (2), (3), and (4) below.

c. Specific requests received by local participating agencies from their own headquarters will be handled as follows:

(1) The agency concerned will inform C.I.G. local interagency office of the request and of any sources which have been recommended.

(2) C.I.G. local interagency office will screen the request to eliminate or consolidate with similar requests received from other participating agencies.

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(3) If the request involves a source previously established as a contact of the requesting agency, C.I.G. will then authorize this agency to make the contact.

(4) If the request involves a source previously established as a contact of another participating agency, C.I.G. will arrange for the collection of the information through the agency having the established contact.

(5) If the specific requirement involves the establishment of a new contact with a business concern or other organization, C.I.G. local interagency office will attempt to establish the contact and arrange for collection.

d. Copies of all information and reports submitted by field agents pursuant to this paragraph will be supplied to C.I.G. local interagency office for recording and dissemination to other Government agencies concerned.

9. In areas where C.I.G. local interagency offices have not been established, the following will govern:

a. Participating agencies will direct their field headquarters to decide amongst themselves which agency will maintain over-all contact with each concern, or organization, or individual. Allocations should be made on the basis of the intelligence potentials of each source as it affects the interest and capabilities of the respective agencies, not on the basis of which agency first established the contact. In case of dispute, the matter will be referred to C.I.G. for decision. Thereafter all contacts with other individuals in each of such concerns or organizations will be coordinated by the agency maintaining over-all contact in the same manner as provided for C.I.G. in paragraph 8 above. C.I.G. will be informed of all allocations made in accordance with the foregoing.

b. No new contacts (see note (b) in paragraph 3 above) will be approached without prior C.I.G. clearance.

c. Copies of all information and reports submitted pursuant to this paragraph will be supplied to C.I.G. for recording in the Contact Register and dissemination to other Government agencies concerned.

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IV. SUPPORTING DIRECTIVES.

To ensure the coordinated execution of the above provisions and of the over-all policies and procedures laid down by N.I.A. Directive No. 5 and C.I.G. Directive No. 15, appropriate directives in conformity herewith will be issued by all participating agencies, after coordination with C.I.G. in each instance.

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COPY NO. 28

13 November 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

CORRECTION
TO
SUPPLEMENTAL DIRECTIVE NO. 1
TO C.I.G. DIRECTIVE NO. 15

EXPLOITATION OF AMERICAN BUSINESS CONCERNS AND
SCIENTIFIC, EDUCATIONAL AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZA-
TIONS WITH CONNECTIONS ABROAD AND AMERICAN RES-
IDENTS TRAVELLING ABROAD AS SOURCES OF FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

Memorandum by the Secretary

Because of a typographical error, it is requested that the enclosed revision of page 4 of Supplemental Directive No. 1 to C.I.G. Directive No. 15 be substituted, and the superseded page destroyed by burning.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

Secretary, N.I.A.

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COPY NO. 28

2 December 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

CORRECTION

TO

SUPPLEMENTAL DIRECTIVE NO. 1
TO C.I.G. DIRECTIVE NO. 15

EXPLOITATION OF AMERICAN BUSINESS CONCERNS AND
SCIENTIFIC, EDUCATIONAL AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZA-
TIONS WITH CONNECTIONS ABROAD AND AMERICAN RES-
IDENTS TRAVELLING ABROAD AS SOURCES OF FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

Memorandum by the Secretary

All holders of the subject directive are requested to correct the typographical error on page 4, line 3, by changing the word "contract" to read "contact".

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

Secretary, N.I.A.

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Correction to
Suppl. Dir. No. 1 to
CIG Directive No. 15

SECRETCOPY NO. 27 *cut*3 April 1947CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPAMENDMENT TO
SUPPLEMENTAL DIRECTIVE NO. 1
TO C.I.G. DIRECTIVE NO. 15EXPLOITATION OF AMERICAN BUSINESS CONCERNS AND
SCIENTIFIC, EDUCATIONAL, AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZA-
TIONS WITH CONNECTIONS ABROAD AND AMERICAN RESIDENTS
TRAVELING ABROAD AS SOURCES OF FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATIONMemorandum by the Secretary

1. The Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Board have agreed to amend paragraphs 5 and 6 of Section II of Supplemental Directive No. 1 to C.I.G. Directive No. 15, dated 12 November 1946, which now reads:

"II. SECURITY MEASURES

"5. C.I.G. will be responsible for security check with F.B.I. of organizations submitted by the participating agencies. All participating agencies will be informed of the existence of any derogatory information.

"6. Participating agencies, before submitting names of individuals to C.I.G., will make security name checks in their own Washington files. C.I.G. will then make name checks with other participating agencies and F.B.I. The agency concerned will be informed of the existence of any derogatory information."

to read:

"II. SECURITY MEASURES.

"5. C.I.G. will be responsible for security name checks of organizations and individuals with F.B.I. At the request of C.I.G., the member agencies will perform name checks on special cases within the limits of capability.

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"6. When a security name check reveals derogatory information, the participating agency which submitted the name will be informed."

2. It is, therefore, requested that the attached amended page 3 of Supplemental Directive No. 1 to C.I.G. Directive No. 15 be substituted for the original page 3 of that Directive and all superseded pages be destroyed by burning.

J. S. EARMAN

Acting Secretary, N.I.A.

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